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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEARCH AND SEIZURE - UNREASONABLE SEARCH
AND SEIZURE AS APPLIED TO THE PERSON. Two federal agents arranged to pur-
chase two grains of heroin from the defendant. In pursuance of the plan, they
furnished marked bills to a government informer who was to make the actual
purchase. The defendant drove his automobile to an intersection to meet the
informer. Police officers than came forward and attempted to make an arrest.
A short struggle ensued, during which the defendant was seen to pass his
hand over his mouth. Taken to a hospital the defendant was placed upon a
table, strapped down, and forced to submit to having a stomach pump insert-
ed down his throat. He was thus forced to emit into a cellophane wrapper
contents which contained heroin. A supplemental search of his clothing dis-
closed the marked money in his pocket. On this set of facts, the search and
seizure was held illegal as being unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment although the officers had probable cause for making the arrest
without a warrant. In accord with the Federal rule of admissibility, all such
evidence so procured was excluded. United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745
(S.D.Cal., 1949).
The general rule that evidence is not rendered inadmissible simply because
it has been unlawfully obtained was not disturbed until 1886 when the United
States Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States I declared unconstitutional the
admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure.
The Boyd case remained unquestioned for twenty years, then in Adams v.
New York 2 the Supreme Court virtually repudiated the view set down in the
Boyd case. After another twenty years, the Court in Weeks v. United States,8
reverted to the original doctrine of the Boyd case with the condition that the
illegality of the search and seizure should be raised by a motion before trial
for return of the thing seized. The procedure for excluding eveidence ob-
tained by unlawful searches and seizures is now set forth in the Federal Rules
of criminal procedure.
4
Only one other instance in the reported cases can be found where evidence
procured from the stomachs of the defendant was offered in a court
of the United States. In that case, In re Guzzardi,s the court found that the
federal officer had not participated in the search, but was called in after the
evidence had been obtained, and also that the defendant had consented to
the search.
To decide cases of this type it is necessary to make a detailed study in re-
trospect of cases decided, and to mold these precedents into a form that will
be desirable henceforward. So it follows logically that views regarding cir-
2 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
'192 U.S. 585 (1904).
3232 U.S. 383 (1914). Noteworthy articles on the subject of searches and seizures
within the constitutional prohibition are: Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34
Harv. L. Rev. 361 1921); Grant, The Constitutional Basis of the Rule Forbidding the
Use of Illegally Seized Evidence, 15 So. Calif. L. Rev. 60 (1941); Wood, The Scope of
the Constitutional Immunity against Searches and Seizures, 34 W. Va. L. Rev. 1 (1927).
4Fed. R. Crim. P., §41 (e) requires motion to suppress before trial unless defendant
was unaware of opportunity, yet court may entertain motion during trial if it sees fit.
584 F. Supp. 294 (N.D.Tex. 1949). In the instant case of United States v. Wills the
iudge skipped over in a rather cursory manner the reason why the evidence there obtained
was any more illegal than the forcing of the defendant to give fingerprints or the taking
of the size of the defendant's shoes for comparison with those left at the scene of
the crime.
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cumstances like those here presented ultimately depend on the functions of
the Fourth Amendment. 6 When the framers of the Constitution realized the
need of restriction against unreasonable search and seizure, they had two
forms to draw from, the Massachusetts plan, or the Virginia plan. Their choice
was the Massachusetts view to guard against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures within the United States Constitution. This is clear proof that they
intended to give wide scope to this protection against police intrusion.7
The courts have time and time again, given effect to the principles of the
Fourth Amendment and in so upholding these principles they have not taken
a narrow view, but have given it a liberal construction and a wide scope. This
is illustrated in the Boyd case. " It would seem that the right of the people
to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures," would not be violated under ordinary construction of
language, by compelling obedience to a subpoena. But the Supreme Court in
a case where the issue arose held the evidence inadmissible simply because
the information leading to the issue of the subpoena has been unlawfully
secured.8 Literally there is no "search" and "seizure" when a friendly visiter
abstracts papers from an office, yet the Court held in Gouled v. United States 0
that evidence so obtained could not be used.
Despite the right of action the injured party may have against the offending
person making the improper search or seizure, the better policy appears to
be the exclusion of evidence wrongfully seized, i.e., requiring only that the
law enforcement officers themselves follow the law.10
JUDGMENTS - REs JUDICATA - DismissAL oF APPEAL AS MOOT. The office
of Price Administration in 1944 brought suit against the defendant on two
counts. Treble damages were demanded for a breach of Maximum Price Reg-
ulation No. 221 as amended and injunctive relief was asked to prevent
further violations. Since the right to damages depended upon the right to in-
junction, by agreement the treble damage claim was held in abeyance until
the final adjudication of the claim for injunction. There was a judgment for
the defendant in the lower court and OPA appealed., A new and separate
action was filed one year later for treble damages for alleged continued vio-
lation of the price regulations. This action, by agreement, was continued
pending the outcome of the appeal of the injunctive action. Subsequently,
while the appeal was still pending, the President of the United States decon-
trolled the commodity. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that the
question of injunctive relief had become moot.2 Defendant then requested
0 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S.Const., Amend. IV.
7Harris v. United States, 831 U.S. 145, 162 (1947), Frankfurter, J., dissenting.8 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
9255 U.S. 298 (1921). See Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law 748-45 (1989) for
further discussion of this case.
10 The late Professor John H. Wigmore vigorously approved admission of improperly
secured evidence. See Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure,
8 A.B.A.J. 479 (1922).
IBowles v. Munsingwear, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 933 (D.Minn. 1945).
2Fleming v. Munsingwear, Inc., 162 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1947) ("... there now being
no law which would sustain the injunction sought by plaintiff, it seems clear that the
case has become moot .... This court can concern itself only with actual controversies.
... The appeal will therefore be dismissed.")
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the dismissal of the two pending treble damage actions by the lower court on
the ground that the judgment on the injunctive action barred further proceed-
ings on the damage claims. This request was granted and OPA brought an
appeal where it was held that the order of the lower court was proper and a
dismissal of an appeal for mootness affirms the judgment of the lower court.
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 178 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1949).
As a general legal principle a dismissal of the appeal is an affirmance of
the judgment of the lower court. 3 However, its application in the instant case
appears questionable and is extremely contrary to the better view set out in
the Restatement of Judgments, 69 (2): "Where a party to a judgment cannot
obtain the decision of an appellate court because the matter determined against
him is immaterial or moot, the judgment is not conclusive against him in a
subsequent action on a different cause of action." The action for an injunction
and the action for treble damages are two different causes of action.
4
The basic error of the appellate court was the dismissal of the injunctive
suit as moot. A moot question is one in which there is no actual case or con-
troversy.5 It is a fundamental rule that a question will not be regarded as
moot despite matters which may have made it such in some respects, if there
remain rights or liabilities of the litigants which may be adjudicated thereby.6
If the question on the first appeal was moot, then, since no rights Can be
established under a moot question, it appears that the cause originally tried
in the lower court had not been finally adjudicated.7 If the appellate court had
recognized that there were other rights to be determined, then obviously the
judgment of the lower court would be no bar to a subsequent different and
separate cause of action.
The court's reasoning in deciding the issue of treble damages sought by the
OPA as being barred as a matter of res judicata is an improper application of
such doctrine because a moot question determines no rights.8 Because it
determines no rights, the judgment of the lower court is of no effect.
The instant case is probably the result of a public post-war sentiment; the
tenor of 1949 is definitely against sustaining wartime OPA penalties.
This case would probably not arise in North Dakota since the North Dakota
Supreme Court has indicated that it will not dismiss an appeal for mootness
if there are rights of the parties to be determined. 9
MARRIAGE - PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDnEN OF PROOF - PRESUMPTION or
VAIrrY OF SECOND MARRIACE. Two women filed claims to a workmen's
compensation award which was due a deceased workman, each claiming to
be his widow. The testimony of the first claimant was to the effect that she
'Burgess v. Poole, 45 Ark. 373 (1885); Tuttle v. Tuttle, 19 N. D. 748, 124 N.W.
429 (1909); cf. Clark v. Beadle County, 40 S.D. 597, 169 N.W. 23 (1918).
4 Woodbury v. Porter, 158 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1946).
5Fleming v. Munsingwear, Inc., 162 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1947).
'State v. Stutsman, 24 N.D. 68, 139 N.W. 83 (1912); Clark v. Beadle County,
40 S.D. 597, 169 N.W. 23 (1918) (Appellate court should dismiss moot questions.
"yet whenever the judgment if left unreversed will preclude the defeated party as to a
fact vital to his rights. . . . There remains more than a moot question.")
7Gelpi. v. Tugwell, 123 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1941); Knowlton v. Inhabitants of Swamp-
scott, 280 Mass. 69, 181 N.E. 849 (1932); Rawlings v. Claggett, 174 Miss. 845, 165
So. 620 (1936).
sFroemke v. Parker, 39 N.D. 628, 169 N.W. 80 (1918). ("If the matter had become
a moot question, then a reversal of the judgment could not affect the rights of the parties.")
' State v. Stutsman, 24 N.D. 68, 139 N.W. 83 (1912).
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married the deceased in 1923, and that there were nine children of this
marriage. Two of these children were still minors. The first claimant also
testified that she had never obtained a divorce or received notice that the
deceased had done so. She had nevertheless remarried. The second claimant
proved a marriage solemnized in 1941. On this set of facts the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that the two minor children of the first marriage and
the second wife were entitled to share in the award to the exclusion of the
first wife. There is a presumption that a prior marriage continues until its
dissolution is shown and also a presumption of tthe validity of a second
marriage. Where two marriages of the same person are shown, the presump-
tion of the validity of the second marriage overcomes the presumption of the
dissolution is shown and also a presumption of the validity of a second
marriage has the burden of producing evidence of its invalidity, since it will
be presumed the first marriage was legally dissolved. Parker v. American
Lumber Co., 190 Va. 181, 56 S.E.2d 214 (1949).
Whether the presumptions of this case actually conflict presents a difficult
question on which the text writers differ,1 but courts invariably treat these
presumptions as conflicting.2 But with the exception of Iowa,3 courts con-
sistently hold that the presumption in favor of the validity of the second
marriage (hereafter, presumption of validity) overthrows the presumption of
continuance of the first 4 (hereafter, presumption of continuance) and the
presumption of validity must therefore be met with evidence. As a basis
four grounds are assigned: (1) That the prior marriage will be presumed to
be invalid, 5 (2) That the prior marriage was dissolved by death,6 (3) That
one of the parties to the prior marriage obtained a divorce,7 (4) That if the
proof shows no divorce, it will be presumed that the other spouse had the
marriage annulled.8 As to what the attacking party must prove to invalidate
the subsequent marriage, the courts are in irreconcilable conflict, but it is
well established that proof of a prior marriage, presumption of its continuance,
and uncorroborated testimony of the first wife are insufficient. 9 An extreme
'That these presumptions cannot conflict, see 4 Wigmore, Evidence §2493 (3d ed.
1940); 4 Chamberlayne, The Modern Law of Evidence §§1224, 1225 (1913). Contra:
I Jones, Commentaries on Evidence §357 (2d ed. 1926).
21n re Estate of Hughson, 173 Cal. 448, 160 Pac. 548 (1916); Hunter v. Hunter, 111
Cal. 261, 43 Pac. 756 (1896); Pittinger v. Pittinger, 28 Colo. 308, 64 Pac. 195 (1901);
Roberts v. Roberts, 124 Fla. 116, 167 So. 808 (1936); Goodwin v. Goodwin, 113 Iowa
319, 85 N.W. 31 (1901).
31n re Colton's Estate, 129 Iowa 542, 105 N.W. 1008 (1906); Ellis v. Ellis, 58 Iowa
720, 13 N.W. 65 (1882). Isolated cases, subsequently ignored, in agreement: Lindsay v.
Lindsay, 42 N.J. Eq. 150, 7 Atl. 666 (1887); Randlett v. Rice, 141 Mass. 385, 6 N.E.
238 (1886). Followed to slight extent, Williams v. Williams, 63 Wis. 58, 23 N.W.
110 (1885).
4Spears v. Spears, 178 Ark. 720, 12 S.W.2d 875 (1928); Hunter v. Hunter, supra,
note 2; Winter v. Dibble, 251 Ill. 200, 95 N.E. 1093 (1911); Boulden v. Mclntire, 119
Ind. 574, 21 NE. 445 (1889).
5Palmer v. Palmer, 162 N.Y. 130, 56 N.E. 501 (1900).
OCurry v. Curry, 122 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
71n re Hughson's Estate, 173 Cal. 448, 160 Pac. 548 (1916); Winter v. Dibble, 251
Ill. 200, 95 N.E. 1093 (1911); Boulden v. McIntire, 119 Ind. 574, 21 N.E. 445 (1889);
Veazie v. Staples, 308 Mass. 600, 33 N.E.2d 262 (1941).
sLazarowicz v. Lazarowicz, 91 Misc. 116, 154 N.Y. Supp. 107 (1915).
9 Mazzenga v. Rosso, 87 Cal. App.2d 790, 197 P.2d 770 (1948); Pittinger v. Pittinger,
28 Colo. 308, 64 Pac. 195 (1901); Wilson v. Allen, 108 Ga. 275, 33 S.E. 975 (1899)
(Second wife was aggressor and was required to show the divorce she claimed existed);
Holman v. Holman, 288 S.W. 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
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application of the presumption of the validity of the second marriage ' 0 would
tend to make it practically irrebuttable. Where there are children of the
second marriage, the presumption of their legitimacy buttresses the presump-
tion of validity."1 However, this position is weakened by the statement that
the children of a marriage dissolved because of a prior marriage will be
adjudged the legitimate children of a party to the marriage who was in good
faith.' 2 A familiar canon of construction prevalent in decisions is that the
"Law presumes morality, and not immorality; marriage, and not concubinage;
legitimacy, and not bastardy." '3 It has been held that the burden of proof
borne by the attacking party requires proof even of a negative fact 4 where
it is essential to the existence of a right.'5
An early English case, often cited, held that, "Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio is a presumption of law that can be negatived only by disproving
every reasonable possibility." 1 Another significant English case declared,
"The presumption favoring the validity of the second marriage is not to
be lightly repelled and not to be broken in upon or shaken by mere probability,
but the evidence to repel it must be strong, distinct, satisfactory and con-
clusive." 17 Wide American approval has been given this doctrine,' s but
tribunals adopting this view are reluctant to state positively what proof is
adequate. Proof of no divorce in any county of residence of either party was
insufficient because one of them may have procured a divorce in a different
county of one of the four states of residence1 9 Admission by an alleged
bigamist that a prior marriage was subsisting when she entered the second
was overcome by the presumption that her husband had divorced her in
time to make the second marriage legal.20 A divorce of record was excluded
from evidence as it would negate the presumption of validity.21 Iowa alone
refuses to allow the presumption of validity to overthrow the presumption of
continuation, stating that proof of no divorce in all counties of residence would
rebut it.22 The more moderate courts among those that give the presumption
of validity a higher dignity, agree with Iowa as to adequacy of proof.23
Where facts sustained the first wife's contention, it was held that if her
10In re Salvin's Will, 106 Misc. 111, 184 N.Y. Supp. 897 (1919) (must aggressively
exclude every indication or suggestion which may conceivably rescue second marriage).
Contra: Hudspeth v. Hudspeth, 206 S.W.2d 863. (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). See Judicial
Presumptions Respecting Irregular Marriages, 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 508 (1937).
"In re Biersack, 96 Misc. 161, 159 N.Y. Supp. 519 (1916) (but not confined to cases
involving ligitimacy of offspring). Contra: Cole v. Cole, 153 Ill. 585, 38 N.E. 703
(1894) (presumption only arises due to presumption of innocence).
12In re Biersack, supra, note 11.
23Hynes v. McDermott, 91 N.Y. 451, 43 Am. Rep. 677 (1883).
14 Patterson v. Gaines, 6 How. 550 (U.S. 1848).
1 Boulden v. McIntire, 119 Ind. 574, 21 N.E. 445 (1889).
16Piers v. Piers, 9 Eng. Rep. 1118 (1949).
IT Morris v. Davies, 7 Eng. Rep. 365 (1837).
ISHolman v. Holnan, 288 S.W. 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
" Spears v. Spears, 178 Ark. 720, 12 S.W.2d 875 (1928).
2DHunter v. Hunter, 111 Cal. 261, 43 Pac. 756 (1896); Lau v. Lau, 154 N.Y.
Supp. 107 (1914).
"Barker v. Barker, 88 Misc. 300, 158 N.Y. Supp. 413 (1916) (marriages one month
apart); Cf. Coal Run Coal Co. v. Jones, 127 Ill. 379, 8 N.E. 865 (1889) (first wife's
testimony excluded on ground that showing no divorce would not show that second
marriage was invalid).
'=In re Colton's Estate, 129 Iowa 542, 105 N.W. 1008 (1906); Goodwin v. Goodwin,
113 Iowa 319, 85 N.W. 31 (1901); Ellis v. Ellis, 58 Iowa 720, 13 N.W. 65 (1882).
1,n re Smith's Estate, 33 Cal.2d 279, 201 P.2d 539 (1949); Roberts v. Fowler, 124
Fla. 116, 167 So. 808 (1936); Cartwright v. McGown, 121 M11. 388, 12 N.E. 737
(1887) (second marriage void and children of it declared illegitimate); Brokeshoulder
v. Brokeshoulder, 84 Okla. 249, 204 Pac. 284 (1921).
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husband had obtained a divorce, he would have had to do so fraudulently.24
On the other hand, some courts have held that when an affirmative attempt
is made to prove the validity of the second marriage, the presumption shifts
to protect the first marriage. 25 This attitude seems to be consistent with the
rule as to burden of proof. The presumption was not applied where a
bigamist asserted the invalidity of his second marriage.26 The presumption
was rebutted and disproved when a divorce relied upon was shown never to
have been granted.2 7 A well reasoned and often cited case 28 held that the
presumption of validity does not prevail when evidence is introduced, but
that the whole case is then thrown open to be' decided as a fact upon all the
evidence, unfettered by any arbitrary rule. Another court warned that, "If
a presumption of, divorce is applied blindly, without due regard to the facts
of the particular case, the divorce becomes a fiction, and the presumption
becomes a conclusive presumption, i.e., a rule of substantive law by which a
bigamous marriage supplants a lawful one." 29 It has also been said that the
jury may indulge the presumption, but that it cannot be sanctioned as a legal
presumption. 30
An anomaly appears between the civil law and the criminal law where
neither the presumption of validity nor the presumption of death, divorce, or
annulment upon which it is based is ever indulged in prosecutions for
bigamy.31 In cases where this particular conflict of presumptions arises, the
party whose innocence is at stake is usually deceased, and the primary
objective of the litigants is to acquire possession of the benefits arising from
his death. A realistic consideration of the problem requires that a greater
emphasis be placed upon the facts of each case with a displacement of
unreasoned inferences which often places an ineluctable burden on a litigant.
PENAL STATUTES - CONSTRUCTION - LEGISLATIVE INTENT - EJUSDEM
GENEmus. 18 U.S.C. §1462 (1948) declares: "Whoever knowingly deposits with
any express company . . . for carriage . .. in interstate . . . commerce any
obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film,
-1 Cole v. Cole, 153 IIl. 585, 38 N.W. 703 (1894); Ellis v. Ellis, 58 Iowa 720, 13
N.W. 65 (1882); Schmeizel v. Schmeizel, 184 Md. 584, 42 A.2d 106 (1945). Divorces
from other states are sometimes refused recognition. Neely v. Tenn. G.&A.Ry., 145 Ga.
363, 89 S.E. 325 (1916) (presumption not raised in favor of railroad which had paid
second wife earlier); Bell v. Little, 204 App. Div. 235, 197 N.Y. Supp.. 674 (1922);
In re Caltabellotta's Will, 183 App. Div. 753, 171 N.Y.Supp. 82 (1918) (distinguished
between actions in rem, in personam, and for convenience).
Wilson v. Allen, 108 Ga. 275, 33 S.E. 975 (1899); Clark v. Cassidy, 62 Ga.
408 (1879); In re Hamilton, 76 Hun. 200, 27 N.Y.Supp. 813 (1894). Contra: Coal Run
Coal Co. v. Jones, 127 11. 379, 8 N.E. 865 (1889).
mTownsend v. Morgan, 63 A.2d 743 (Md. 1949); In re Sloan's Estate, 50 Wash.
86, 96 Pac. 684 (1908) (Presumption attaching to second marriage only overcomes pre-
sumption of marriage arising from cohabitation and reputation, and is not sufficiently
strong to overcome proofs of prior marriage.)
SWoods v. Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., 141 S.W.2d 972 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
As to degrees of proof required by different courts, see In re Smith's Estate, 33 Cal.2d
279, 201 P.2d 539 (1949); Cole v. Cole, 153 Ill. 585, 38 N.W. 703 (1894); Mitchell
v. Frederick, 166 Md. 42, 170 At. 733 (1934); Colored Knights of Pythias v. Tucker,
92 Miss. 501, 35 So. 51 (1908); In re Aguirre's Estate, 57 Nev. 275, 65 P.2d 685 (1936).2
3Turner v. Williams, 202 Mass. 500, 89 N.E. 110 (1909).
Sehmeizel v. Schmeizel, 184 Md. 584, 42 A.2d 106 (1945).
"Hammond v. Hammond, 43 Tex. Civ.App. 284, 94 S.W. 1067 (1906).55
People v. Lamarr, 20 Cal.2d. 345, 128 P.2d 678 (1942).
,"As to classification of presumptions, see 44 Harv. L. Rev. pp. 931-32. As to presump-
tions generally, see Bohlen, The Elfect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law and Burden of
Proof, 68 U of Pa.L. Rev. 307 (1920); McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Burden
of Proof, 5 N.C.L.Rev. 291 (1927).
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paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent character ... shall
be fined .. .or imprisoned .. " Defendant deposited phonograph records,
admittedly obscene, with an express company for carriage in interstate com-
merce. The District Court held this act to be a violation of the statute. The
Circuit Court reversed,' believing the statute prohibited only matter visibly
obscene. On writ of certiorari the Supreme Court held, with one justice taking
no part and three dissenting, that the sending of obscene phonograph records
in interstate commerce was an act prohibited by the statute. U.S. v. Alpers,
70 S. Ct. 352 (1950).
Strict construction of penal statutes in favor of the accused is a time-
honored rule 2 founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of
individuals.$ Early decisions of the Supreme Court indicate there are no
common law offenses against the United States although that point was never
directly decided. 4 It follows that one cannot be punished for crimes against
the United States unless the act shown constitutes plainly and unmistakably
an offense within the meaning of an act of Congress.5 This rule of strict
construction of penal statutes does not prevent a consideration of the legislative
intent in enacting such statutes,6 nor does the rule of ejusdem generis,
7 if
a literal interpretation will defeat the obvious purpose of the legislature. s The
fact that a particular thing does not exist at the time the law was enacted does
not preclude the application of the law to itiO but such laws must not be
extended by inference or implication.1 The statute in question was first
enacted February 8, 189711 and was soon thereafter held constitutional as a
proper regulation of interstate commerce. 12 It was subsequently amended in
1905 and 19091s and thereafter its constitutionality was re-affirmed in a case
which arose in North Dakota. 14 An amendment in 1920 enlarged the act
to include the words "motion-picture film." 15 This indicates that obscene
motion-picture films were not within the prohibitions of the act prior to the
amendment, although the transmission of obscenity from motion pictures
involves primarily the visual senses. A fortiori the statute does not include
objects transmitting obscenity solely through auditory senses. It is not the
general intent but the special intent of Congress manifested in the Act that
5Alpers v. U.S., 175 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1949).
2U.S. v. Resnick, 299 U.S. 207 (1936); U.S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (U.S.
1820).
3 U.S. v. Wiltberger, nipra note 2.
4U.S. v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32 (U.S. 1812); U.S. v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415 (U.S.
1816); U. S. v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677 (1822); U.S. v. Worrall, 2 DalI. 384 (U.S. 1798).
5Fasulo v. U.S., 272 U.S. 620 (1926); Todd v. U.S., 158 U.S. 278, 282 (1895);
SarUs v. U.S., 152 U.S. 570 (1894); U.S. v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255 (1890).
4U.S v. Hartwell, 6 Wall 385 (U.S: 1867); U.S. v. Corbett, 215 U.S. 233 (1909).
7 General words following a designation of particular things or acts embrace only those
acts or things of the same general nature as those specified. Gooch v. U.S., 297 U.S.
124 (1936); Crawford, Statutory Construction 327 (1940); Black's Law Dict. 645
(3d ed. 1933).
sU.S. v. Hartwell, supra note 2; U.S. v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393 (1908); U.S. v. Mescall,
215 U.S. 26 (1909).
9Browder v. U.S. 312 U.S. 335, 339 (1941).
10
Todd v. U.S., supra note 5; U.S. v. Harris, 177 U.S. 305 (1900).
U29 Stat. 512 (1897).
uU.S. v. Popper,. 98 F. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1899).
1333 Stat. 705 (1905); 35 Stat. 1138 (1909).
24 Clark v. U.S., 211 F. 916 (8th Cir. 1914).
2541 Stat. 1060 (1920).
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controls; 16 penal statutes should not be extended to things or acts not within
its descriptive terms.1 7
To justify this court's decision the words "phonograph records" must be
included within the meaning of the phrase "other matter of indecent character."
But all the items specifically enumerated in the statute involve one's visual
senses, while phonograph records involve the reproduction of sound trans-
mitted to a person through his auditory senses. Clearly, a wide dissimilarity
exists. The decision in the instant case seems to enlarge the application of
legislative intent to include acts within the spirit though not within the letter
of the law.' 8
TAXATION - FEDERAL INCOME TAX - EXEMPTIONS.- EDUCATIONAL INSTI-
TUTION OPERATINc BUSINF.SS. New York University in seeking to invest its
funds organized the taxpayer as a charitable corporation. Through a merger
the University acquired the business of the C. F. Mueller Co., a well known
manufacturer of macaroni products. The business was to be operated
exclusively for the benefit of the Law School of New York University. Subse-
quently the Tax Commissioner assessed income tax on the profits of the
Corporation for past years. The Corporation claimed income tax immunity
under §101 (6) of the Internal Revenue Code,' arguing that they were
exempt and that the test to be used was the destination of the income. It was
shown that they did not act as a tax exempt corporation in that they paid
social security taxes and deducted charitable contributions. The Tax Court in
approving the Commissioner's action, said that Congress did not intend in
§101 (6) to include in the exempt class a corporation organized and operated
for educational purposes but having as its only activity the operation of a
competitive commercial business for profit, even though the earnings go solely
to the benefit of a separate corporation which itself would be exempt under
§101 (6). The Tax Court indicated that the test in determining whether an
institution is exempt under §101 (6) is to decide the source of the income
rather than the destination of the income. C. F. Mueller Company, 14
T.C.111%i (1950).
This is a departure from past decisions concerning exemptions under §101
(6). However, the present interpretation is a logical one. The development
2 U.s. v. Harris, supra note 10.
17 U.S. v. Resnick, supra note 2; U.S. v. Harris, supra note 10.
Is Prior to the decision in the instant case case and after the decision in the court below,
a bill was introduced in the House of Represenatives at the request of the Department of
Justice to amend the statute so as to prohibit the transportation of obscene phonograph
records in interstate commerce. H.R. 6622, 81st Cong., 2d. Sess. In requesting such
amendment the Justice Department stated that whether the present law applied to
phonograph records or not was questionable. The new measure would prohibit mailing of
"every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy, or vile article, matter, thing, device, or
substance." See 19 U.S.L. Week 2046 (U.S. July 25, 1950).
' Int. Rev. Code §101. Exemptions from Tax on Corporations. The following organizations
shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter- . . . (6) Corporations, and any com-
munity chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary or, educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual, and no substantial part of the activities of which is
carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation. ...
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of the rule which allowed exemptions based upon the destination of the
income 2 seems to have arisen because of two factors.
The first factor was the type of cases before the court. The earlier cases
generally applied to charitable organizations which had income-raising
activities on a business basis, but which were a very minor part of their
overall activities. 3 In such a case the exemption was probably reasonable.
This was extended in Roche's Beach, 96 F.2d (2d Cir. 1938), to include a
separate corporation whose income was to go to charitable purposes, although
it was engaged in competitive commercial business. This view was later
restricted by refusing exemption to a corporation originally organized for
profit, but which subsequently dedicated its earnings to exempt purposes.4
The second factor is the changing economic effects of taxation. In earlier
years the effect of tax exemption on business operations was relatively un-
important, but, with increasingly high tax rates, a tax exempt business had a
tremendous competitive advantage. It was to this that the Tax Court referred
when they suggested that exempting Mueller from taxation was not advan-
tageous to the public and actually could have a big disadvantage should
Mueller decide to undersell his competitors and expand.
The need for remedial action in the present type of situation is apparent;
such need has been met in the 1950 Revenue Act. 5 Should this case come
up irk North Dakota the Mueller case will probably be followed since our
Code section is very similar to 101 (6).
6
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION - SHOULD BENEFITS BE PAID WORKMEN
ON STRIKE OR LocKED OUT? The Sacramento Bakery Workers' Union sought
changes in its master contract with the Bakers' Association. Though forewarned
that a strike against one would be treated as a strike against all, the Union
struck at the Butter Cream plant. Eight other bakers, Association members,
retaliated with a lockout of all Union employees. The Insurance Appeals Board
granted unemployment compensation to those locked-out employees and
charged each employer's account with the payments made. The Association
appealed, contending that §56 (a) of California's Unemployment Compensation
Act excludes these claimants from benefits.1 In a four to three decision, it
was held that the volitional cause of the work stoppage rested with the Union,
and hence these employees were not entitled to unemployment payments.
McKinley v. California Employment Stabilization Comm'n. 209 P.2d 602
(Cal. 1949). The court reasoned that the strike at Butter Cream, like a
boomerang, caused the general lockout.
2
Roche's Beach, 96 F.2d 776 (2nd Cir. 1938) (exemption fund). See also Debs
Memorial Radio Fund v. Comm., 148 F.2d 948 (2nd Cir. 1945); Edward Orton, Jr.
Ceramic Foundation, 9 T.C. 533 (1947).
3Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578 (1924).
Universal Oil Products Co. v. Campbell, 181 F.2d 451 (1950).
Sec. 303, 1950 Revenue Act, which became law Sept. 23, 1950. This provision
taxes the income of unrelated business activities of exempt organizations.
e157-3809, N.D. Rev. Code. (1943). Other Organizations Not Subject to Tax. The
following organizations shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter ... (8) Cor-
porations organized and operating exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or edu-
cational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the
net earnings of which inure to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual.
"'An individual is not eligible for benefits for unemployment . . . (a) If he left his
work because of a trade dispute .... " Stat. 1945, ch. 1178, p. 2225, Deering's Gen.
Laws, 1945 Pocket Supp., Act 8780d, sec. 56.
2/d. at 606.
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All 48 states have some sort of provision excluding workmen jobless due to
labor disputes. 3 Such unanimity results because the employer alone con-
tributes to the unemployment funds in all but two states;' of course he
should not be compelled to finance those who foment a labor dispute with
him.5 On the other hand, those involuntarily and innocently out of work
should not be denied benefits, as the very purpose of the Unemployment Act
is to ameliorate the consequences of involuntary unemployment.6 It thus
becomes the difficult task of administrative bureaus and the courts to determine
who caused the work stoppage.
Most states 7 avoid the instant problem by refusing to distinguish between
strikes and lockouts. The usual statute denies benefits if there is a "stoppage
of work which exists because of a labor dispute." 8 These jurisdictions sacrifice
justice for ease of administration. 9 An equally unjust but easy solution would
be to compensate for all unemployment resulting from any type of labor
dispute.10
California's unique phrasing ("if he left his work because of a trade
dispute") implies in the word left that only a voluntary cessation -of work
will disqualify, and its courts have so held." Thus California is committed
to the volitional cause test and forsakes ease of administration in the com-
mendable search for justice. The instant case and a prior similar one 12
vividly illustrate the complications involved.
Several commentators have sought to formulate rules of decision based
upon who seeks to change the status quo.
13 
In the application of these rules
there has arisen the "employer-fault" concept wherein payments to employees
are limited to cases where the employer is at fault.1
4 
The desire to skirt
administrative difficulties has led a few writers to advocate repeal of all
labor dispute disqualification clauses,15 while another cogent analyst suggests
3 Fierst and Spector, Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes, 49 Yale L.J.
461 (1940); 33 Minn. L. Rev. 758, 763 (1949).
4Alabama and New Jersey. See Social Security Administration, Comparison of State
Unemployment Insurance Laws as of October 1948, p. 13 (1948).
5Barnes v. Hall, 285 Ky. 160, 146 S.W.2d 929 (1940); Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297
Mich. 438, 298 N.W. 87 (1941).
eSteward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1938); Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California
Employment Comm'n, 17 Cal.2d 321, 328, 109 P.2d 935, 940 (1941).
Including North Dakota. See N.D. Rev. Code 152-0602 (4) (1943).
sFierst and Spector, supra note 3, at 462.
' 9 U. of Chi, L. Rev. 751, 756.
1o Id. at 756.
11 Bodinsou Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Comm'n, 17 Cal.2d 321, 328, 109
P.2d 935, 940 (1941); Mattson Terminals v. California Employment Comm'n, 24 Cal.2d
695, 151 P.2d 202 (1944); W.R. Grace and Co. v. California Employment Comm'n, 24
Cal.2d 720, 151 P.2d 215 (1944).
"Bunny Waffle Shop v. California Employment Comin'n, 24 Cal.2d 735, 151 P.2d
224 (1944).
1" Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compensation, 55 Yale L.J. 167, 173
(1945); 33 Minn. L. Rev. 758, 767. These writers suggest that if the labor dispute was
caused by employee-initiated action, benefits should be denied, while if employer-initiated
action precipitates the dispute, benefits should be granted.
' See Letter of A. J. Altmeyer (chairman of the Social Security Board) to War
Mobilization Director Byrnes, reprinted in 90 Cong. Rec. 6841 (1944) ("The function
of disqualifications is shifting from limiting benefits to workers unemployed through no
fault of their own to limiting payment to cases where the employer is at fault.");
Compare Johnson v. Pratt, 200 S.C. 315, 20 S.E.2d 865 (1942) with W.Va. Code
Ann. 52366 (78) (1942).
1Schindler, Collective Bargaining and Unemployment Insurance Legislation, 38 Col.
L.Rev. 858, 886 (1938); Fierst and Spector, supra note 3, at 489.
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a compromise in which benefits are paid locked-out employees, but the amounts
are not charged against the employer's account.1 6
None of these proposals entirely solve the basic three-headed problem:
How (1) to pay unemployment benefits to the victims of a maladjusted
economy (2) without aiding or penalizing either side in a labor dispute and
(3) without burdening administrative bodies and the courts. Perhaps the
solution lies in changing the source of unemployment funds from employer
to employee contributions; then the employer cannot complain that his money
is subsidizing those engaged in a dispute with him.1 7 Payments could then be
made to all labor dispute claimants, regardless of who caused the work
stoppage. The purpose behind the unemployment acts (to aid the victims of
a maladjusted economy) would be fulfilled, while the policy behind the labor
dispute disqualifications (that the employer should not be compelled to
finance those engaged in a controversy with him) would no longer be
pertinent.
Under the present scheme of employer contributions for employee bene-
fits, the labor dispute clauses will continue to plague any court seeking to
do justice between labor and management.
WILLS - OLOGRAPUIC WILLS - VALIDITY OF WELL NOT SIGNED AT END.
The decedent left an instrument contained in an envelope which bore, in
her handwriting, the inscription, "Will of Ella McNair." The instrument
consisted of three handwritten pages. At the top of the first page appeared
the date, followed by the words, "I Ella McNair," in the exordium clause. A
similar expression appeared on the third sheet. The back side of the third
page proceeded to make further bequests and terminated at the middle of
the page without signature or marks of any kind. The South Dakota Supreme
Court held that the words "I Ella McNair" in the exordium clause and her
name at the top of each page of the will constituted a signature within the
meaning of the South Dakota Code which requires that every will, other
than a nuncupative will, must be signed, and the will was accordingly admitted
to probate. In re McNair's Estate, 38 N.W.2d 449 (S.D.1949).
The applicable South Dakota statutes 1 make no reference as to where the
signature of a testator is to appear on the instrument. The only requirements
for a valid olographic will are that the document must (1) be testamentary
in character, (2) be written entirely in the hand of the testator, (3) be dated,
and (4) signed by the hand of the testator himself. A failure in any one
of these requirements nullifies the will. - Prior to the ruling in this case the
South Dakota courts had applied the rule that the only evidence that would
warrant the conclusion that an olographic will was a complete and executed
document must have been found "in and on" the instrument itself. As a
consequence it is not material where the name of the testator appears in a
16 33 Minn. L. Rev. 758 (1949).
27See 19 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 294 (1942).
'The requisites of an olographic will are set forth in S.D. Code 156.0209 (1939):
"An olographic will is one that is entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand
of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form and may be made in or out of
this state, and need not be witnessed.- The same provision is found in N.D. Rev. Code
§56-0304 (1943).
2Succession of Fitzhugh, 170 La. 122, 127 So. 386 (1930); Montague v. Street, 59
N.D. 618, 231 N. W. 728 (1930); cf. In re McKee (McKee v. Buck), 72 N.D. 86, 4 N.W.2d
652 (1942).
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will of this character if it can be gathered from an inspection of the whole
instrument that it is intended as a last will and testament and the statute is
then satisfied.3 So it was held in In re McMahon's Estate,4 that an olographic
will without a signature at the end thereof, or elsewhere, containing a phrase
in the body of the will, "written, dated and signed by my own hand,"- was
valid. The court stated that this was sufficient to constitute a signature inas-
much as the testatrix had declared that she had signed the document by her
own hand and therefore there was an adoption of her signature in the execu-
tion of the will.
As to the question of admissibility of extrinsic evidence in cases of olographic
wills without signatures other than in tthe exordium clauses, there is a division
of opinion. The rule in some jurisdictions is that the intent of the testator is
to be determined from the face of the instrument itself, and extrinsic evidence
is not admissible on the issue of whether the testator's name appearing in the
body of the instrument was intended as a signature.5 The court in In re
Hurley's Estate,6 held that when the written name of the testator is in the
exordium there must be something in the document or in the closing paragraph
to indicate that the testator intended to adopt that signature as the executing
signature of his will. It was also held in In re Devlin's Estate,7 that the
evidence of a name in the exordium clause only, is insufficient to prove
execution where no inference can be drawn from the language itself that the
testator signed the document or intended to adopt as his executing signature
the name he had inserted in the exordium. In Succession of Dyer,8 the
court found such a document to be void as a will on the ground that provisions
of a dispositive nature following the signature could have no effect. The under-
lying theory is that the placing of the signature at the end of the will is
predicated upon the approval which the testator thereby gives to tthe testa-
mentary disposition which proceeded it. The Virginia court, in construing a
will similar to that involved in the instant case, has said that the testator's
intention to adopt his name in the exordium clause as his signature must appear
on the face of the will itself, and extrinsic evidence is not admissible to
show such intention. This result is based on the theory that the mere
placing of the testator's name in the exordium clause is an equivocal act and
furnishes no ground for any inference that subsequent bequests are intended
to be final.9 Other jurisdictions admit extrinsic evidence in order to allow
the acts and declarations of the testator to be shown for the purpose of
determining whether he intended his name, as it appears in the body of the
will, to be his signature. The signature authenticates and completes the
document.1o
It may be argued that the abrupt manner in which the will was terminated
at the middle of the last page without signature indicated an incomplete
3In re Brandow's Estate, 59 S.D. 364, 240 N.W. 323 (1932).
4 174 Cal. 423, 163 Pac. 669 (1917).
5in re Manchester's Estate, 174 Cal. 417, 163 Pac. 358 (1917).
'178 Cal. 713, 174 Pac. 669 (1918).
7 198 Cal. 721, 247 Pac. 577 (1926).
s155 La. 265, 99 So. 214 (1924).
9 Warrick v. Warrick, 86 Va. 596, 10 S.E. 843 (1890).
1
0
Peace v. Edwards, 170 N.C. 64, 86 S.E. 807 (1915).
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wll.1 The dissent in the instant case took the position that the name was
so placed at the top of the pages merely for the purpose of identification of
the will and not for authentication or indicating its completeness. Nevertheless,
the South Dakota court appears to be in agreement with the weight of the
cases. The finding is supported by the fact that the will bore a date nineteen
months prior to the testatrix's death which strongly suggests that the decedent
recognized the document as her completed will. In the case of In re Kenney's
Estate,12 the court stated that the fact that sufficient space remained on the
last page to include additional writing if decedent had intended any further
declarations is also evidence of finality and completeness. Further, the
testatrix took the instrument to the hospital with her. The court found that
all the circumstances lead one to the conclusion that the decedent did consider
the instrument to be a completed will.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - CUSTOMARY AcTs AND ACTs By CONSENT,
DIREcTIoN, OR AcQUIESCENCE OF EMPLOYER - COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES.
Claimant had been cleaning company tools in gasoline. While waiting for the
drill to be brought out of the ground, he proceeded to clean the engine of his
personal car. A spark from the starter ignited his clothing, causing severe bums
for which he demanded compensation. The court found that the company
customarily allowed workmen to tinker with their personal cars during spare
time on the job; that such activity was incidental to the employment and con-
templated thereby. It was held that claimant was entitled to compensation
although the injury arose out of an act not strictly in furtherance of his
employer's business. Hillyard v. Lohmann-Johnson Drilling Company, 168
Kan. 177, 211 P.2d 89 (1949).
In Kansas the injury must arise "in the course of" and "out of" the employ-
ment,' whereas in North Dakota the injury need only arise "in the course of"
the employment,2 and therefore the injury may be more easily proved com-
pensable in North Dakota.3
Under the policy of liberal construction of the Workmen's Compensation
laws 4 courts usually grant compensation for injuries suffered by an employee
while performing an act for the mutual benefit of employer and employee
even though the benefit to the employer is slight. 5 This is a liberalization of
the old rule that denied compensation unless the employee was working
either directly or indirectly for the employer.6
uIn re Bernard's Estate, 197 Cal. 36, 239 Pac. 404, (1925), stated that the abrupt
termination of a will near the middle of the last page, without a signature, furnished a
strong indication of the decedent's intent to do something more to make the document
a completed will.
16 Cal. 50, 104 P.2d 782 (1940).
1 Kan. Rev. Stat. §44-501 (1923).
2N.D. Rev. Code §65-0102 (1943).
3 Kary v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 67 N.D. 334, 272 N.W.
340, 341 (1937)-.
4Schwan v. Premack, 70 S.D. 371, 17 N.W.2d 911 (1945); Thoreson v. Schmahl,
222 Minn. 304, 24 N.W.2d 273 (1946).
5Wamhoff v. Wagner Electric Corp., 354 Mo. 711, 190 S.W.2d 915 (1945); Linder-
man v. Cownie Furs, 234 Iowa 708, 13 N.W.2d 677 (1944); Kennedy v. Thompson
Lumber Co., 223 Minn. 277, 26 N.W.2d 459 (1947). Contra: Hammond v. Keim, 128
Neb. 310, 258 N.W. 478 (1935).
GRadtke Bros. v. Ind. Comm'n of Wisconsin, 174 Wis. 212, 183 N.W. 168 (1921);
Bellman v. Northern Minn. Ore. Co., 167 Minn. 269, 208 N.W. 802 (1926); Mann v.
Glastonbury Knitting Co., 90 Conn. 116, 96 AUt. 368 (1916); Brienen v. Wisconsin
Public Service Co., 166 Wis. 24, 163 N.W. 182 (1917).
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The North Dakota Supreme Court has stated 7 that, to impose liability,
the work from which the injury arises must be something incident to and
contemplated by the contract of employment. In determining whether a
certain act is reasonably contemplated, the custom and usage of a particular
employment should be considered.$ But to impose employer liability based
on custom, proof must be clear as to antiquity, duration, and universality of
the custom. 9
Custom has been shown to impose liability in "noon-hour" cases (those
where injury arose during a noon off-duty period),1 o and the true rule to
be derived from the cases is that the injury is compensable if it occurs while
the employee is doing those reasonable things that his contract of employment
expressly, impliedly, or by custom authorizes him to do." l The weight of
authority is to the effect that where an injury arises out of a settled practice
or condition known to the employer and there is a causal relation between
the injury and the practice or condition, the injury is compensable.12
The instant case seems to be in direct accord with this modem broad view
of liability.
IDesauteIl v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 72 N.D. 35, 4 N.W.2d 581 (1942).
'Employer's Liability Assurance Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 37 Cal. App.2d
567, 99 P.2d 1089 (1940).
'Davis v. North State Veneer Corp., 200 N.C. 263, 156 S.E. 859 (1931).10 
Racine Rubber Co. v. Industrial Comni'n, 165 Wis. 600, 162 N.W. 664 (1917);
Desautell v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 72 N.D. 35, 4 N.W.2d 581 (1942);
cf. Morse v. Port Huron and D.R. Co., 251 Mich. 309, 232 N.W. 369 (1930); Chance
v. Reliance Coal and Mining Co., 108 Kan. 121, 193 P. 889 (1920). Contra: Kary v.
N.D. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 67 N.D. 334, 272 N.W. 340 (1937); Pillen
v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 60 N.D. 465, 235 N.W. 354 (1931).
21 Employer's Liability Assurance Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 37 Cal. App.2d
567, 573, 99 P.2d 1089, 1092 (1940); Desautell v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau,
72 N.D. 35, 4 N.W.2d 581 (1942).
1Re Ayers, 66 Ind. App. 458, 118 N.E. 386 (1918); American Steel Foundries v.
Czapala, 112 Ind. App. 212, 44 N.E.2d 204 (1942); Wamboff v. Wagner Electric Corp.,
354 Mo. 711, 190 S.W.2d 915 (1945); cf. Vitas v. Grace Hospital Soc'y, 107 Conn. 512,
141 At. 649 (1928); Dunn v. University of Rochester, 266 N.Y. 362, 194 N.E.
856 (1935).
